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Appeals Court Rules Cattle Marketing Agreements are not Anti-Competitive
Market Report
Yr 
Ago
4 Wks
Ago 8/26/05
Livestock and Products,
 Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
  35-65% Choice, Live Weight . . . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
  Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
  Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb . . . . .
Choice Boxed Beef, 
  600-750 lb. Carcass . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
  Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Pigs, National Direct
  45 lbs, FOB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass,     
  51-52% Lean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., 90-160 lbs.,
  Shorn, Midwest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout,
   FOB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
$82.95
143.26
119.09
138.38
70.68
47.99
73.85
92.25
212.58
$79.02
131.45
114.66
125.53
66.61
45.70
71.89
101.00
249.50
$81.59
133.06
120.48
133.01
70.35
49.85
75.65
94.00
241.57
Crops, 
 Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
  Columbus, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
  Minneapolis, MN , bu . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.20
2.19
6.14
3.07
1.63
3.02
1.89
6.58
3.23
1.81
          *
1.66
5.87
2.68
1.70
Hay
 Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
  Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
  Northeast Nebraska, ton . . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
  Platte Valley, ton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
  Northeast Nebraska, ton . . . . . . . . . . .
117.50
62.50
57.50
117.50
37.50
52.50
117.50
37.50
52.50
* No market.
Traditionally cattle have been purchased for cash
prices on the open market, at livestock auctions or
directly from cattle producers. Cattle buyers from
meatpackers negotiate with feedlot operators to pur-
chase pens of cattle, attempting to estimate the average
quality that the cattle will yield on the spot. Feedlot
operators consider bids from competing packers and
then decide which offer to accept. Cattle are delivered
seven days from the date of the purchase. 
One problem with the cash market approach is that
occasionally packers would end up with too few cattle
on a particular day to efficiently run their packing
facility. Then packers would either pay a premium
(often a hefty premium) to obtain sufficient cattle
quickly to operate that day, close down or else operate
at less than full capacity. These slaughter cattle price
premiums raised the average price received by cash
sellers of cattle. 
In the 1980s the use of cattle “marketing agree-
ments” began. Under these marketing agreements,
cattle are purchased based on the previous week’s
average cash price, and then further adjusted by the
cattle’s grade and yield after they were slaughtered.
The packer could call for delivery of the cattle at any
time within two weeks. An advantage of the marketing
agreement approach is that cattle buyers don’t need to
travel to feedlots all over the country to negotiate
prices for pens of cattle. This saves time for both the
feedlot operator and the cattle buyer. It also allowed
packers to even out the supply of cattle so that they
could avoid having to pay higher prices in order to
keep their facilities operating at full capacity. Tyson,
the largest beef packer in the U.S., purchases 30-50
percent of its cattle through marketing agreements. 
Under the Packers & Stockyards Act of 1921 (the
PSA) it is unlawful for meatpackers to engage in any
“unfair, unjustly discriminatory or deceptive practice”
or to “manipulate or control prices” of livestock
purchased for slaughter. The PSA was adopted to
prevent packers from continuing such clearly anti-
competitive practices as e.g. Packer A agreeing not to
bid against Packer B for Nebraska cattle if Packer B
agreed not to bid against Packer A for Kansas cattle.
Apparently it is an open legal question whether the
use of cattle marketing agreements automatically
violates the PSA. The Federal Appeals Court for the
11  Circuit recently ruled that cattle marketing agree-th
ments in and of themselves did not violate the PSA,
but could violate the PSA if their use was anti-com-
petitive. 
The issue arose in the lawsuit Pickett v. Tyson
Fresh Meats. Mr. Pickett is an Alabama cattle pro-
ducer who contended that the use of marketing
agreements by Tyson lowered cash prices and there-
fore violated the PSA. The jury agreed with Mr.
Pickett and awarded the class of cash cattle sellers
$1.28 billion in damages. The trial judge set aside the
jury verdict and ruled that the use of marketing
agreements by Tyson did not violate the PSA. The
trial judge’s ruling was affirmed on appeal by a three-
judge panel of the 11  Circuit Federal Court ofth
Appeals. The appeals court ruled that there were
several legitimate business purposes for using cattle
marketing agreements, including requiring less effort
to acquire the necessary cattle to operate a slaughter
facility, and better timing of cattle delivery to avoid
live cattle shortages. There was considerable testi-
mony at trial that many cattle sellers themselves will
sell cattle only through marketing agreements and will
not use the cash market. The appeals court ruled that
seeking to avoid paying a premium on the cash market
in order to have enough cattle to operate slaughter
facilities efficiently was a legitimate business purpose
and not a PSA violation. The appeals court concluded
that Pickett had failed to prove that the use of market-
ing agreements was anti-competitive. Pickett’s attor-
neys have stated that they will appeal the decision to
the full panel of judges in the 11  Circuit, and ifth
necessary to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Commentary. Some ag law specialists (who are
more knowledgeable about the PSA than I) have
expressed surprise at the court of appeals’ ruling,
apparently because the court based its ruling on anti-
trust and fair trade law in general instead of earlier
PSA cases. What surprises me is that the Pickett
plaintiffs felt that the use of marketing agreements was
automatically anti-competitive. The pen-by-pen
purchase of slaughter cattle seems archaic, and it is not
surprising that some cattle sellers miss the opportunity
to obtain a windfall profit when a packer is short of
cattle on a particular day. But if the use of marketing
agreements to reduce the need to pay this premium
when the slaughter facility is short of cattle seems to
fall far short of my conception of what constitutes anti-
competitive business behavior. I understand that many
ag producers, not just cattle producers, distrust futures
markets, marketing agreements and the like on princi-
ple, in part because they may be subject to manipula-
tion. But no one proved (or even alleged) that prices
were being manipulated here, except that marketing
agreements allowed packers to avoid paying premiums
on days they came up short of cattle. Marketing
agreements seem like a natural modernization of
livestock marketing practices, which may be why some
producers don’t like it. 
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